Pro-FTA links

• The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement Business Group (AUSFTA)
• Centre for International Economics publications
• USTR Site on US-Australia FTA

Anti-FTA links

• A completely misleading description:The US-Australia “free trade” agreement isn’t, by John Quiggin
• Linda Weiss, Elizabeth Thurbon and John Mathews, How to kill a country: The Australia-U.S. free trade agreement, Evatt Foundation paper, 20 April 2005.
• Global Trade Watch (Australia), An Explanation of Some Key Elements of the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement, and Predicted Impacts on Australia
• Citizens’ Trade Campaign Site on Australia-U.S. FTA

Other links

• Potential Australia/China FTA
• Details of Japan/Australia trade
• Japan/Australia Relations

Before ousting Howard from office, new PM Rudd had already outlined a foreign policy vision that would be substantially different to his predecessor. Whereas Howard had overwhelmingly focussed on the US alliance, often to the detriment of our relations with regional neighbours, Rudd sought to take a more multilateral approach.

As shadow foreign minister, Rudd reformulated Labor’s foreign policy in terms of “Three Pillars”: engagement with the UN, engagement with Asia, and the US alliance.

The Three Pillars

UN

As PM, Rudd has already sought to repair the somewhat strained relationship Howard had with the UN, announcing in August 2008 the intention to make torture a separate criminal offence, and to ratify the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture, a treaty which allows UN and domestic inspectors to visit prisons and detention centres. Howard had been critical of any attempts by the UN to involve itself in domestic matters. It is unclear how Rudd’s support for the convention will affect Australian forces abroad. The Attorney-General, Robert McClelland, said the measures were intended to improve Australia’s human rights record and its relationship with the UN.

The prime minister has embraced multilateral organisations like the UN as a key part of the government’s foreign policy and Australia is seeking a temporary seat on the UN Security Council in 2013-14. He has also foregrounded the importance of the Millennium Development Goals - a move that is understandable, given his approach to dealing with potential threats from Asia, more of which below.

The US Alliance

Speaking in 2007, Kevin Rudd said Labor would withdraw Australian troops from Iraq in the near future. This was a radical change of direction for Australian foreign policy, partially made viable by the likelihood of a Democrat US President in the near future. With support for the Iraq War flagging in the US, it is likely an incoming President would perhaps be more sympathetic to our withdrawal. At present, Rudd supports Australian troops remaining in Iraq, but not on a combat basis.
Asia

Mr Rudd also promised to provide greater economic support to Australia’s neighbours as part of a new foreign policy plan he’s calling “pacific partnership for development and security”.

He argued that tackling poverty, unemployment and poor education - in what’s become known as the “arc of instability” to Australia’s north - is the best way to prevent the emergence of failed states and the threat of terrorism. In other words, if we improve living conditions for our neighbours, they are less likely to turn on us.

We can see this attempt to prevent threats by sending aid fits in well with prior Labor governments focussing on the role of Australia as ‘Good International Citizen.’ Rudd has stressed that he feels Australia should take a more active role in world affairs. The goodwill created by Australia support for areas devastated by the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami was a reminder to politicians of the power of overseas aid.

Hot Flashes:

Japan

Criticising Japan for their whaling practices and not including Tokyo on his first overseas tour as PM caused some ructions between Australia and Japan. Japan have also been concerned that Rudd is placing too much emphasis on China, their key regional rival.

Security and Whaling on Rudd’s Japan Agenda

Rudd visit to make up for Japan snub

Georgia

Rudd’s attitude to Russian involvement in Georgia differs from that taken by the current US administration. While President Bush has taken an agressive approach, leading Russia to warn of an impending, new Cold War, Rudd has promised aid to Georgia. While backing the US position, at present, the involvement of Australian troops has been ruled out. Should the relationship between the Russia and the West deteoriate further - a McCain/Palin presidency would likely take a hard line - Australia would undoubtedly side with the US but might find itself in a very difficult position regionally.

Govt set to send Georgia Aid Package

Rudd’s Foreign Policy on Georgia (mp3)

Other links:

Rudd and National Security

Rudd’s foreign fumbles

More active foreign policy for Rudd

Three factors affected Australia’s move toward a new relationship with the US. These are:

1. The Guam Statement
2. Changing Economic Times - as the economic worth of Asia became clear
3. Detente

Whitlam’s government felt that the somewhat basic “Us vs Them” Cold War thinking of the last 25 years was outdated. The security environment of the early 1970s seemed to require more complex relationships, particularly with our Asian neighbours. In a sense, this saw Australia moving away from relying on one big, powerful ally in favour of mulitlateral power relationships. These new relationships were, however, not to be at the expense of old ones. In other words, we weren’t ditching the US completely and would still rely on their support if we got into too much trouble.

The era of containment was coming to an end as the PRC took China’s seat at the UN and US president Nixon visited China.

Whitlam felt that the USSR were no longer a major threat globally, particularly not to Australia. With relationships between the USSR and the USA improving and the existing nuclear stalement seeming to make conflict unlikely, Whitlam felt that the ANZUS treaty was of lower priority than previous governments had believed it to be. As a result his government began taking interest in other areas.

Australia would play a larger role in our region, particularly in terms of trade. We would seek to be recognised as an independent country, a middle power, rather than a satellite of either the UK or the USA. However, in reality, Australia’s foreign policy differed little from that of the US throughout this period. In general, we continued to go along with US actions and policy decisions.

An exception to this was renewed bombing in Vietnam in December 1972. Whitlam’s government were reassessing the country’s involvement in the Vietnam war. The war had proved increasingly unpopular in Australia and the new Labor government saw the conflict to be mistaken in continuing so long.

Some believe that Whitlam’s government strayed too far from the US line on certain issues. Certainly, Whitlam was critical of some alleged CIA (US spies) operations within Australia and pushed for more transparency regarding US bases and intelligence facilities such as Pine Gap (which had opened in 1966.) He also expressed concern about the CIA tendency to topple left wing governments such as Allende’s Chiliean government in 1973.

Whitlam ordered that the names of all Central Intelligence Agency personnel in Australia be supplied to him. In 1975, Whitlam dismissed the heads of both ASIS and ASIO. The former because he had been secretly assisting the CIA in covert activities in East Timor during the brief civil war there.(2) Then, at the beginning of November, it was revealed in the press that a former CIA officer, Richard Lee Stallings, had been channelling funds to Doug Anthony, leader of the Country Party (one of the most conservative parties in Australia), then in opposition.

It was reported that Stallings was a close friend and former tenant of Anthony’s, that the secret installations in the hinterland were indeed CIA creations, and that Stallings had been the first head of much of the operation. No doubt scenting political advantage, Whitlam publicly declared the tenant of Doug Anthony’s house in Canberra to be a retired Agency employee, and former Director of the Joint Defence Space Research Facility at Pine Gap. It was not until the 1980s that it was revealed by the then Labor Government that the so-called space research activities at Pine Gap employed intelligence officers.

Some believe that pushing the US on its intelligence activities within Australia (which were later revealed to be significant) may have led to Whitlam’s downfall. Released memos suggest that American sources were concerned about this. The Governor General,  Sir John Kerr,  publicly stated: “This the greatest risk to the nation’s security there has ever been.” Some believe that he was meeting with the CIA who, in funding right wing groups and lobbying them to block supply, ultimately brought about Whitlam’s dismissal.

Although there has never been any concrete evidence to support these claims, Whitlam’s fall from power stood as a stark reminder that our security relationship with the US was not to be tampered with.

For more information:

http://melbourne.indymedia.org/news/2005/11/99757.php

http://epress.anu.edu.au/sdsc/dpm/mobile_devices/ch02s25.html

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,17183521-7583,00.html

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1JQ7-xvgcHA

Speech

The Hon. Alexander Downer, MP
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AUSTRALIA

11 July 2006

To Flinders University

40 Years of Australian Foreign Policy - Democracy, Liberalism and Australia’s National Interests

Introduction

Thank you Professor Edwards (Vice Chancellor). Congratulations on the 40 year anniversary of this outstanding university.   From a campus with an initial 400 students 40 years ago, the Flinders community has built a world class institution of which South Australia can be justifiably proud.

40 Years of Australian Foreign Policy

Major anniversaries are a time to reflect on change.  And I guess change is always a theme when considering Australian foreign policy over any period - including the past forty years.  You only need to look at the foreign policy context of 1966 to see the extent of change that’s occurred since that time in the world, in Australia’s outlook on the world, and in the action of Australian foreign policy.

In 1966, superpower competition was the dominant theme of global affairs, and it seemed at the time would remain so for many generations.  The Berlin Wall was only a few years old.  China was thrown into the pain and chaos of the Cultural Revolution.  And Australia was involved directly in the struggle against communist expansion in South East Asia.

The same year, the Holt Government took major and irrevocable steps towards the complete dismantling of the White Australia policy - an action which was vital for our growth as a nation and for our image in the world.

Two preoccupations for Australian foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s were Britain’s withdrawal from its military network east of Suez and its entry into the European Union.  And after a generation of building an independent foreign policy, Australia faced - and was ready to face - the challenges posed by Britain’s shift of economic and strategic focus away from the Asia-Pacific.

During the past forty years, we have witnessed some remarkable shifts in global relations and in the dynamics of our region.  But there has also been continuity.  And this evening, I’d like to share some thoughts on the contemporary relevance of what I consider to be a continuing theme in Australian foreign policy over the past forty years - and that is, our support for freedom and liberal democracy in the world.

Australian values and freedom

Now, I know that Australians don’t tend to talk much about the value of freedom.  Some think that freedom’s a very American thing to talk about these days.  But freedom in its many forms - political, economic, social, intellectual - is essential to Australia’s experience.

Australia is a stable, independent and welcoming nation, with an open and prosperous economy, and a pluralistic and democratic society - in fact one of the world’s oldest continuous democracies.  It was one of the first countries to grant women the right to vote - in 1894 in South Australia.  And Australia has long been a haven for people escaping from violence and oppression in their own lands. So it’s rightly recognised throughout the world as a country of freedom.

Of course, Australia has not evolved and matured as a strong liberal democracy in isolation.  The freedoms we enjoy are the legacy of diverse influences - some ancient and some modern. But just as Australia has opened itself to the influences of the world, we have not held ourselves back from seeking to influence the world either.

Forty years ago, the then Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck observed that Australia and I quote: “had never been neutralist or isolationist.”  He said that Australia had emerged as a nation “in a tradition of loyalty to certain causes and certain principles that involved us in world events including war.”  Hasluck also said that Australia’s foreign policy had been strongly influenced by the idea that “we cannot live for ourselves alone but have to contribute to the peace of the world”.

Hasluck was referring to the willing contribution of Australia and Australians to the great 20th century struggles - against German militarism, European fascism, Japanese imperialism, and communist aggression and expansion in Asia.  He was talking about our contribution to the development of sustainable free societies in our region, including through the Colombo Plan.

Australia met these struggles and challenges - as a nation but also at a personal level - because we saw clearly that even events on the other side of the world would affect the way we lived our lives.  And because we believed in the importance and the enduring value of liberal democracy - not just for Australians, but for other peoples as well.

Hasluck’s words forty years ago could just as easily be said today.  Australia remains neither neutralist nor isolationist.  And over the past forty years, we haven’t lived for ourselves alone, but have made our contributions to the world.  We fought communism, we opposed apartheid, we supported self-determination for East Timor, and we continue our contest with economic protectionism throughout the world.

Australia’s tradition of loyalty to the principles of freedom in the world - be they political, economic, social or intellectual - has remained one of the strongest influences on our active foreign policy over the past forty years.

This is not because Australia has been unable to conceive of alternatives beyond our own traditions and experience.  University libraries contain no end of failed ideas from which we could choose.  It’s because we believe that the liberal democratic model provides the best mechanism for addressing political, economic and social problems - globally, as well as locally.
We believe that governments and societies which tend towards liberal democracy are better at creating wealth, alleviating poverty, respecting human rights, fostering creativity and bringing stability to the world.

Liberal democracy is the soundest basis for peace and prosperity.  It’s the basis for dynamism and innovation.  It’s in Australia’s national interest for democracy to spread.  And so it’s a core value of our foreign policy.

These are powerful and enduring principles on which to base the pursuit of Australia’s national interests.  The Australian people would not support any government that conducted foreign policy divorced from the values which underpin our own society.
These principles put us on the right side of history.  Sixty-seven dictatorships have fallen since 1972.  A billion individuals - in eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America - have been emancipated from tyranny in one generation.
They are principles which seem to me are difficult to contest, yet contested they are by critics who charge the Government is naïve in its desire to see democracy spread.

This Government believes democracy is good, but we have never said it was easy.  We know that democracy can’t be imposed.  Every country is different and in every country internal demand for change is vital for success.

Economic Development

We also know that economic development helps encourage political development.  And we know that strong institutions are integral to both processes.

Economic development itself, as Indian Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen has pointed out, can be seen as a process of expanding the real freedoms people enjoy.  We know from a century of experience that poverty is not reduced without economic growth.  And central to economic growth is a reliable system of property rights.  To encourage investment you simply must have enforceable contracts and a reliable court system for resolving disputes.  Arbitrary behavior by Governments or their cronies is a sure way to scare off investment - both foreign and local.

There are those in the anti-globalisation movement who question the value of the economic freedom.  But they are fighting ideological wars which really have been resolved in intellectual terms for some time now.  The historical record of free markets and globalisation is clear and strong.

In 1820, about 85% of the world’s population was living in absolute poverty - usually defined as living on less than one dollar a day in today’s terms.  By 1950, that figure had fallen to 50%.  Today, it is about 20%.

This is not to argue that the benefits of globalisation are spread equally or immediately passed on to all countries.  But the answer is not to retreat - flat earth style - to protectionism and mercantilism.  The answer lies in helping to spread access to the global market place.

Good governance

Of course, creating and sustaining free societies requires more than just a tradition of regular elections and economic liberalisation.  Good governance and effective institutions are essential building-blocks of free societies.
That’s one of the reasons why Australian foreign policy and our $3 billion international development aid program place such great importance on improving governance - particularly in the Pacific and Indonesia.

Through the aid program we’re doing a lot in this area.  In Indonesia, for example, we’ve run workshops for 700 Indonesian judges to improve judicial conduct.

Developing institutions is no easy task, and it takes time.  And despite appearances, I think we’ve made some remarkable progress over the years.

If we take a look at our immediate neighborhood for a minute. Sure, we have seen a degree of political instability and even violence in the cases of East Timor and Solomon Islands.  But we can also see the glass as half full.  In both East Timor and Solomon Islands the political crises are being resolved through constitutional means.

The violence there is certainly to be condemned; but it has been contained and has not been allowed to drive political outcomes.
In Papua New Guinea we expect to see a Government serve a full five year term for the first time since independence.  The political system there seems to be maturing.

And in Indonesia we have seen the emergence of a vibrant democracy and institutions are increasingly accountable.
No doubt, we have a long way to go.  But compared to other parts of the world - Africa for example - we have been successful in our efforts to support democratic outcomes.

Security

Security is another essential element for free societies.That’s one of the reasons why Australia is committed to supporting better security in our region and beyond.  We’re helping Solomon Islands and East Timor strengthen their ability to enforce law and order.  We’re working with partners in South East Asia to help reduce the risk of terrorism.  And we’re committed to helping Iraq and Afghanistan.

The courage shown in recent years by ordinary Iraqis and Afghans - braving terrorist violence to exercise the freedom to vote - is testimony to the power of the appeal of freedom and democracy.  The bravery of those Afghan women who risk their lives for the cause of democracy in a country where zealots burn schools and kill girls’ teachers should inspire us all.

The example of these Afghan and Iraqi people validates Australia’s on-going contribution to security in those two countries.
Freedom in their interests and ours

It is natural to want these countries to succeed - only the terrorists themselves and the most bitter and twisted critics of the United States and the international coalition would wish for failure.

We also know that the opening of freedom does not provide instant solutions and can sometimes increase uncertainty in the short term.

The degree of difficulty is certainly high.  We can blame the Jihadists for that.  But ask the ordinary Iraqis whether they would turn back the clock and the answer is certainly not.

And a high degree of difficulty is not a good reason to embrace the status quo, to pretend that the world is standing still.  The world is not standing still.  In fact the world changed quite a lot on and since September 11 2001.

The lesson from that terrible event is that allowing repressive and aggressive regimes to carry on unhindered is dangerous, even negligent.  When a regime like the Taliban says it hates the West and invites fellow travelers to use its country as a base, best to take them at their word.

I don’t claim we can remove every dictator in the world.  But nor do I believe it is a sensible strategy to just walk on the other side of the street.  When Iran says it wishes to wipe Israel off the map, it would be folly in the extreme to sit back and allow them to develop a nuclear weapon.  When Iran supports terrorism, just as Syria does, then it undermines international security.

Of course there are grey areas.  Many of the regimes in the Middle East are responsible global citizens, struggling with terrorism just as we do.  But in the long run they will only defeat radicalism by opening their political systems and introducing democracy.

It’s plainly a challenge.  A quick look at Gaza and the West Bank tells you that democracy is not a quick fix in the absence of sound institutions and a mature political culture.

But what’s the alternative?  Lock-in an unpopular and autocratic regime?  That’s just screwing the lid tighter, waiting for a bigger explosion later on.

Conclusion

I started my remarks here this evening by noting that there was no expectation in 1966 that superpower competition between the United States and the Soviet Union would end less than a generation later.  It did.

The current global challenge to freedom might end soon.  But more likely we are facing a long struggle.  Despite some successes, terrorist capacity has not been eliminated.  And the ideology driving the terrorist violence has not been universally discredited.

Australia will need to - and of course will - work with partners in the region and throughout the world to meet this continuing challenge.  We cannot turn our backs on our global responsibilities.

History will not treat this generation kindly if we pursue our narrow interests and steer clear of the bigger challenges, if we take a laissez-faire attitude to freedom.

I’m confident that support for freedom will continue to be one of the strongest themes of Australian foreign policy in the years and decades to come.
Thank you.

ENDS

from http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2006/060711_40years.html

Expeditionary Force Mentality

Pre-WWII, Australia’s approach to foreign policy can be referred to as an “Expeditionary Force Mentality.” In other words, we saw ourselves as being part of Britain’s armed forces, being a former colony.

We fought in Britain’s wars, as we wished them to see us as part of the imperial framework. If we were, essentially, part of their Empire, then they would come and rescue us when the Asian hordes attacked.

In 1931, Britain passed the Statute of Westminster, telling former colonies such as Australia that they were free to make their own foreign policy from then on. Australia were so dependent on Britain’s protection (it was also a cheap means of defence) that it wasn’t until 1942 that Australia ratified the Statute, by which time we had attached ourselves to the USA.

Australia did still however make its own foreign policy decisions, but went along with whatever Britain did. We still established our own Navy and Army.

Throughout the 1930s and 40s, Australia developed a dual position of loyalty to Britain and seeking independence (concern for own interests.)

With outbreak of WWII, our fear of the Japanese pushed us to seek British support again by being part of British war effort. But when it became clear the British couldn’t defend the Commonwealth in Asia (With Singapore and Hong Kong falling to the Japanese by 1943) Australia looked elsewhere for support. Australia pulled troops out of Europe and, in 1941, Prime Minister John Curtin announced ‘Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional ties or kinship with the UK’.

Despite increased independence, Australia knew it relied on Collective Security. That is, we needed to be part of a collective of states and allies. If it wanted help from other states, then it would need to contribute to their security needs.

Forward Defence

- a permanent force would be raised to ‘block’ the approaches to Australia or tackle potential problems before they reached us.

- The principle was the same as before. Build up goodwill with allies so that we could call on them in an our of need, as well as combating threats before they reached us

- This force would be part of the SEATO

SEATO

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), was an international organization for collective defense created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the Manila Pact, which was signed on September 8, 1954. The formal institution of SEATO was established at a meeting of treaty partners in Bangkok in February 1955.^[1] It was primarily created to block further Communist gains in Southeast Asia. The organization’s headquarters was located in Bangkok, Thailand. SEATO was dissolved on June 30, 1977.

Members

Australia

France

New Zealand

Pakistan

Philippines

Thailand

United Kingdom

United States

South Vietnam

South Korea

History

SEATO was planned to be a Southeast Asian version of NATO, in which the military forces of each member would be coordinated to provide for the collective defense of the members. SEATO did use portions of the military forces of its members in annual joint training manoeuvres.

The membership of SEATO reflected a mid-1950s’ combination of “out of area” powers and “in area” pro-Western nations. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States represented the strongest Western powers. Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, and New Zealand represented Europeanized or pro-Western nations in the Southeast Asian area. As a pro-Western central Asian country, Pakistan also joined.

Despite being intended to provide a collective, anti-communist shield to Southeast Asia, SEATO was unable to intervene in the conflicts in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam because an intervention required a decision of unanimity, which was never reached; France and the Philippines objected. Intervention in the Vietnam conflict was sought again later, but France and Pakistan withheld support.

Unlike the NATO alliance, SEATO had no joint commands with standing forces. Also unlike NATO, an attack on one member was not automatically considered an attack on all. Consequently, each member could effectively block any collective SEATO action. Given the declining interest of France (after 1954) and the United Kingdom (after the end of the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict, in 1966) in Southeast Asia, SEATO failed to be effective as a collective security organization.

The United States sought, but failed, to make the Vietnam War into a SEATO collective defense problem.

Consequently, questions of dissolving the organization arose as early as 1973. Pakistan withdrew on November 7, 1973. and France withdrew on June 30, 1974. The organization formally ended in 1977.

SEATO was created as part of the Truman Doctrine of creating anti-communist bilateral and collective defense treaties. These treaties and agreements were intended to create alliances that would contain communist power. This policy was considered to have been largely developed by American diplomat and Soviet expert George F. Kennan. President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1953-1959)was the primary force behind the creation of SEATO, which expanded the concept of anti-communist collective defense to Southeast Asia.

Containment

Forward defence was the guiding principle for Australian FP from WWII-early 1970s, when the Vietnam War had shown it to be limited in terms of success

A large part of Forward Defence operations would be the containment of communism (within WWII borders), as the Cold War developed.

Australia identified with US Capitalists. Fear of the red peril and the domino theory dominated the national consciousness. The conflicts we became involved in through the 1950s-1970s were largely as a result of this and as part of our increasing ties with the US.

In 1951, the ANZUS treaty was signed. It still remains popular with the Australian public, largely as they feel it offers us protection. Underlined with purchase of military hardware from the Americans.

Although New Zealand and Australia committed forces to the Malayan Emergency, the Korean War and subsequently fought with the US in the Vietnam War, (all wars designed to contain communism) the treaty wasn’t invoked by Australia until the then Prime Minister needed to justify Australian involvement in Afghanistan, post-September 11.

Despite this treaty, Australia had to be prepared to act independently with threats to interests. Two events underlined this.

1966 – East of Suez: The UK effectively announced that former colonies “east of the Suez Canal” would have to fend for themselves.

1969 – Guam Statement – The US announced that allies in the pacific region had to be prepared to defend themselves. Australia would have to build its own defence, unable to wholly rely on the USA. This greatly influenced Australian Foreign Policy of the 1970s.

The Malayan Emergency

The Malayan Emergency was a state of emergency declared by the British colonial government of Malaya in 1948 and lifted in 1960, as well as an insurrection and guerrilla war fought between government forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army around the same period. The state of emergency entailed the revocation of many civil rights, the granting of special powers to the police, and other measures aimed at the suppression of left wing political movements, especially the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The guerrilla war was part of the ongoing conflict between the MCP and other leftists, and the colonial establishment, starting shortly after the Japanese withdrawal in 1945 and extending to the signing of the peace treaty between the communists and the government of Malaya in December 1989. The Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) was the military arm of the MCP, and was supplied by the Min Yuen or Mass Organisation.

Korean War June 25, 1950 until the armistice signed on July 27, 1953.

The crisis in Korea originated in the closing phases of the Second World War, when control of the Korean peninsula, formerly occupied by Japan, was entrusted to the Allies, and the United States and the Soviet Union divided responsibility for the country between them at the 38th parallel. Over the course of the next few years, the Soviet Union fostered a strong communist regime in the north, while the US supported the government in the south; by mid-1950, tensions between the two zones, each under a different regime, had escalated to the point where two hostile armies were building up along the border. On 25 June a North Korean army finally crossed into the southern zone and advanced towards the capital, Seoul. The city fell in less than a week, and North Korean forces continued their southward drive towards the strategically important port of Pusan.

Within two days, the US had offered air and sea support to South Korea, and the United Nations Security Council asked all its members to assist in repelling the North Korean attack. Twenty-one nations responded by providing troops, ships, aircraft and medical teams. Australia’s contribution included 77 Squadron of the RAAF and the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR), both of which were stationed in Japan at the time as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force.

When 3 RAR arrived in Pusan on 28 September, the North Korean advance had been halted and their army was in full retreat. The Supreme Commander of the UN forces, General Douglas MacArthur, was given permission to pursue them into North Korea, despite warnings from the Chinese government that it would not countenance any UN troops crossing the border. 3 RAR moved north as part of the invasion force and fought their first major action near the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. As the UN forces continued their advance towards the Yalu river on the border between North Korea and Manchuria, a series of successes led many to believe that the UN forces would soon bring the war to an end.

At the same time, unbeknown to the UN commanders, the Chinese government had made good its threat and moved 18 divisions into North Korea. They struck with overwhelming force against US troops on 1 November and sent them into retreat. By mid-November, despite the continuing Chinese attacks in the harsh winter weather, MacArthur prepared a massive advance to the Yalu River to defeat the North Korean and Chinese forces once and for all. But only one day after the attack commenced the Chinese struck back, inflicting successive defeats on the UN forces and forcing them into retreat towards the 38th parallel.

The Chinese halted their offensive in January 1951, Seoul once again having fallen to the invading forces. At the UN headquarters in New York, efforts were made to conclude a ceasefire with the communist coalition, but negotiations broke down before any progress had been made. By the end of February, Chinese resistance collapsed south of the Han River near Seoul, and the city was recaptured by UN forces in mid-March. UN commanders were then faced with the question of whether to cross the 38th parallel once again. Opinions were divided between those who favoured a cease-fire along the border and those, including MacArthur, who wished to renew the northward advance. On 11 April 1951 MacArthur was dismissed from his command, as it was feared in Washington that his intemperance was likely to escalate the war.

Australian troops participated in two major battles in 1951. On the evening of 22 April, Chinese forces attacked the Kapyong valley and forced South Korean and New Zealand troops into retreat; other UN troops, including Australians, were ordered to halt the attack. After a night of fierce fighting, during which their positions were overrun, the Australians recaptured their postions and stalled the Chinese advance, at a cost of only 32 men killed and 53 wounded. For their contribution to this action, 3 RAR was awarded a US Presidential Citation.

The second major battle for the Australians was Operation Commando, an attack against a Chinese-held salient in a bend of the Imjin, a river running north-south that crosses the 38th parallel just above Seoul. Here the Commonwealth Division, including the Australians, had two key objectives: Hills 355 and 317. The attack began on 3 October, and after five days of heavy fighting the Chinese withdrew. Twenty Australians were killed in the battle and 89 were wounded.

From 1951 on, both sides found themselves engaged in a war of attrition reminiscent of the Western Front, where men lived in tunnels, redoubts and sandbagged forts behind barbed wire defences. The war was generally fought with artillery and mines and in set-piece battles; at night patrols ventured into no man’s land to raid enemy positions. Between 1951 and the war’s end, 3 RAR occupied trenches at the eastern extremity of the Commonwealth Division’s position in hills north-east of the Imjin River. There they faced heavily fortified Chinese positions across a stretch of no man’s land which ranged from 300 metres to 2 kilometres in width.

As the war settled into stalemate it became apparent that a negotiated truce was the only solution, but military pressure was maintained on the communist forces, the better to extract concessions at the peace talks. As fighting continued, however, many of the UN combatants grew less willing to contribute more ground forces to the conflict. While some countries were keen to extricate their troops from Korea, Australia increased its commitment, and the government sent a second battalion, 1 RAR, which joined the Commonwealth Division on 1 June 1952. The battalion remained in Korea for twelve months, leaving in March 1953 and replaced by 2 RAR in April.

After two years and 17 days of negotiations, even as heavy fighting continued at the front, the UN and North Korean leaderships signed an agreement on 27 July 1953. This agreement technically brought the war to an end, but a state of suspended hostilities continued to exist between North and South Korea for many years, and even today the situation remains unresolved. In the three years of fighting 1,263 men of the Commonwealth forces were killed and a further 4,817 were wounded, while the US lost 33,000 men. Australian casualties numbered more than 1,500, of whom 339 were killed. Almost half a million South Koreans died as a result of the war, and an unknown number of North Koreans.

(from http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/korea.asp)

Vietnam War 1962–75

Australian support for South Vietnam in the early 1960s was in keeping with the policies of other nations, particularly the United States, to stem the spread of communism in Europe and Asia. In 1961 and 1962 Ngo Dinh Diem, leader of the government in South Vietnam, repeatedly requested security assistance from the US and its allies. Australia eventually responded with 30 military advisers, dispatched as the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV), also known as “the team”. Their arrival in South Vietnam during July and August 1962 was the beginning of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. In August 1964 the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) also sent a flight of Caribou transports to the port town of Vung Tau.

By early 1965, when it had become clear that South Vietnam could not stave off the communist insurgents and their North Vietnamese comrades for more than a few months, the US commenced a major escalation of the war. By the end of the year it had committed 200,000 troops to the conflict. As part of the build up, the US government requested further support from friendly countries in the region, including Australia. The Australian government dispatched the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR) in June 1965 to serve alongside the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in Bien Hoa province.

The following year the Australian government felt that Australia’s involvement in the conflict should be both strong and identifiable. In March 1966 the government announced the dispatch of a taskforce to replace 1RAR, consisting of two battalions and support services (including a RAAF squadron of Iroquois helicopters), to be based at Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy province. Unlike 1RAR, the taskforce was assigned its own area of operations and included conscripts who had been called up under the National Service Scheme, introduced in 1964. All nine RAR battalions served in the taskforce at one time or another, before it was withdrawn in 1971; at the height of Australian involvement it numbered some 8,500 troops. A third RAAF squadron (of Canberra jet bombers) was also committed in 1967 and destroyers of the Royal Australian Navy joined US patrols off the North Vietnamese coast. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) also contributed a clearance diving team and a helicopter detachment that operated with the US Army from October 1967.

In August 1966 a company of 6RAR was engaged in one of Australia’s heaviest actions of the war, near Long Tan. After three hours of fierce fighting, during which it seemed the Australian forces would be overrun by the enemy’s greater numbers, the Viet Cong withdrew, leaving behind 245 dead and carrying away many more casualties. Eighteen Australians were killed and 24 wounded. The battle eliminated communist dominance over the province.

The year 1968 began with a major offensive by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, launched during the Vietnamese lunar new year holiday period, known as “Tet”. Not only the timing but the scale of the offensive came as a complete surprise, taking in cities, towns, and military installations in South Vietnam. While the “Tet Offensive” ultimately ended in military defeat for the communists, it was propaganda victory. US military planners began to question if a decisive victory could ever be achieved and the offensive stimulated the US public opposition to the war. For Australian troops, the effects of the offensive were felt around their base at Nui Dat, where a Viet Cong attack on targets around Baria, the provincial capital, was repulsed with few casualties.

By 1969 anti-war protests were gathering momentum in Australia. Opposition to conscription mounted, as more people came to believe the war could not be won. A “Don’t register” campaign to dissuade young men from registering for conscription gained increasing support and some of the protests grew violent. The US government began to implement a policy of “Vietnamisation”, the term coined for a gradual withdrawal of US forces that would leave the war in the hands of the South Vietnamese. With the start of the phased withdrawals, the emphasis of the activities of the Australians in Phuoc Tuy province shifted to the provision of training to the South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces.

At the end of April 1970 US and South Vietnamese troops were ordered to cross the border into Cambodia. While the invasion succeeded in capturing large quantities of North Vietnamese arms, destroying bunkers and sanctuaries, and killing enemy soldiers, it ultimately proved disastrous. By bringing combat into Cambodia, the invasion drove many people to join the underground opposition, the Khmer Rouge, irreparably weakening the Cambodian government. When the Khmer Rouge came to power in April 1975 it imposed a cruel and repressive regime that killed several million Cambodians and left the country with internal conflict that continues today. The extension of the war into a sovereign state, formally neutral, inflamed anti-war sentiment in the United States and provided the impetus for further anti-war demonstrations in Australia. In the well-known Moratoriums of 1970, more than 200,000 people gathered to protest against the war, in cities and towns throughout the country.

By late 1970 Australia had also begun to wind down its military effort in Vietnam. The 8th Battalion departed in November but, to make up for the decrease in troop numbers, the Team’s strength was increased and its efforts, like those of the taskforce, became concentrated in Phuoc Tuy province. The withdrawal of troops and all air units continued throughout 1971 – the last battalion left Nui Dat on 7 November, while a handful of advisers belonging to the Team remained in Vietnam the following year. In December 1972 they became the last Australian troops to come home, with their unit having seen continuous service in South Vietnam for ten and a half years. Australia’s participation in the war was formally declared at an end when the Governor-General issued a proclamation on 11 January 1973. The only combat troops remaining in Vietnam were a platoon guarding the Australian embassy in Saigon, which was withdrawn in June 1973.

In early 1975 the communists launched a major offensive in the north of South Vietnam, resulting in the fall of Saigon on 30 April. In the previous month a RAAF detachment of 7-8 Hercules transports flew humanitarian missions to aid civilian refugees displaced by the fighting and carried out the evacuation of Vietnamese orphans (Operation Babylift), before finally taking out embassy staff on 25 April.

From the time of the arrival of the first members of the Team in 1962 almost 60,000 Australians, including ground troops and air force and navy personnel, served in Vietnam; 521 died as a result of the war and over 3,000 were wounded. The war was the cause of the greatest social and political dissent in Australia since the conscription referendums of the First World War. Many draft resisters, conscientious objectors, and protesters were fined or gaoled, while soldiers met a hostile reception on their return home.

(from http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/vietnam.htm)

A Turning Point

The Vietnam War, coupled with the Guam Statement would provide a turning point for Australian Foreign Policy, signalling the end of Forward Defence. Australia would no longer seek to protect itself by fighting in surrounding areas, but rather by concentrating on protecting the mainland.

The Success of Forward Defence

The positives for Forward Defence can be seen as:

- long-term stability for Australia

- cheap defence (relying on allies)

- benefits for military defence and technology through alliances

The negatives might be seen as:

- Many saw Australia as constantly fighting other people’s wars

- Our dependence on the US was seen as effectively limiting Australian sovereignty and the possibilities for Foreign policy formation.

* 1885 - Australian troops are sent to assist Britain fighting in Sudan.

* 1899-1901 - Australian troops assist the British during the Boer War

* 1914 - Australian soldiers are sent to the First World War. This was first time Australians had fought for Australia, as opposed to Britain.

* 1939 - Australia enters the Second World War

* 1941 - Labor comes to power under John Curtin

* 1942-43 - Japanese planes make almost 100 attacks against sites in the Northern Territory, Western Australia and Queensland.

* 1946 - Minister for Immigration Arthur Calwell introduces the major post-war immigration scheme

* 1948 - Australia becomes a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

* 1949 - The Nationality and Citizenship Act is passed. Rather than being identified as subjects of Britain, the Act established Australian citizenship for people who met eligibility requirements.

* 1950 -Australian troops are sent to the Korean War, as well as to fight a communist insurgency in Malaya

* 1951 - Australia signs the ANZUS treaty with the United States and New Zealand

* 1962 - Australia enters the Vietnam War

* 1968 - Australia signs the nuclear non-proliferation treaty;

* 1970 - More than 200,000 people participate in the largest demonstrations in Australian history, against the Vietnam War

* 1972 - The first Labor government since 1949 is elected under the leadership of Gough Whitlam

* 1972 - Australia recognises the People’s Republic of China

* 1999 - Australian soldiers are deployed to East Timor as part of the INTERFET peacekeeping force

* 2002 - On 12 October 2002 bombs explode in a Bali nightclub and bar killing 202 people, including 88 Australians.

* 2003 - Australian military deployed to participate in the Iraq War as part of the “Coalition of the Willing”.

* 2006 - Australian Forces are again deployed to East Timor to help stabilize the country.

* 2007 - Australians Forces are brought home from East Timor.

* 2007 - Australian Forces begin withdrawing from Iraq on June 1.

1. Compile a table featuring at least ten of these events, explaining the significance for Australian Foreign Policy. If the event involves a decision, is it one made from pragmatism or principle?

eg. In what way did Australia entering the Vietnam War serve that National Interest?

Why were Australian Forces deployed in East Timor in 2006? Was this a pragmatic or principled decision?

2. Research the 1946 Post-War Immigration scheme. How did this serve the National Interest?

These links may be useful:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_Australia
http://www.nautilus.org/~rmit/forum-reports/0616a-jones.html

Factors

There are essentially five constant factors that are seen to be in Australia’s National Interest. These are:

1. Geographic - our position locally, regionally and globally
2. Demographic - the people who constitute our nation
3. Economic
4. Cultural - this can be expressed through subsidising the arts or implementing quotas for Australian material on TV and Radio
5. Historical

Governments may disagree on interpretations of how each of these factors should be represented in terms of policy, but they generally agree on the importance of each of them.

Despite our geographic position, Australia has always seen itself as part of the Western world, with more in common culturally with the UK and USA. Being surrounded by Asia and, therefore, Asians, whose culture seemed quite alien to white settlers, two themes have always dominated foreign policy.

1. Threat Mentality - at any moment, Australia might be overcome (or overrun) by our more populous neighbours (eg. China, Japan, Indonesia). More recently, the Howard Government (arguably) benefitted from promising security from the threat posed by Islamic Terrorists.
2. Need for a Powerful Ally - too small to defend ourselves, Australia has always sought protection by close relationships initially with Britain and, post-WWII, with the USA.

A third theme which surfaces from time to time is this:

3.  Being a Good International Citizen - This essentially refers to policy designed not on pragmatic grounds but instead from a point of principle. It can be seen as contributing to International Standing, but is focussed on policy based on ideas or ideals, rather than any National advantage. Tow politicians are often singled out with regard to this theme, both of them belonging to the Labor party. These are H.V Evatt, who played a role in the creation of the UN and Gareth Evans, who served under the Hawke and Keating governments.

Being a Good International Citizen generally involves focussing less on bilateral alliances, such as those Australian had relied on with Britain and the US and more on multilateral power relationships. For example, the Hawke government, and even more so the Keating government, aimed to shift the emphasis of Australia’s foreign policy from Australia’s traditional relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom to Australia’s Asian neighbours, particularly Indonesia and China. To this end, Evans travelled tirelessly in the region, and built up good relations with his counterparts in most Asian countries.

Critics of both men suggest that developing such multilateral relationships can threaten our relationship with the US. Evatt’s efforts to boost international cooperation were ultimately deflated by the onset of the Cold War, as the world rapidly divided into two power blocs. More details here.

History

The history of Australian Foreign Policy divides roughly into three stages.

1. Pre-1901: The Colonial Period. Before federation, we were a British colony and therefore sheltered beneath the umbrella of Empire. Australia sent troops to a number of British conflicts, in the hope they would return the favour when we were inevitably invaded, overrun or outnumbered by the vast numbers of non-white neighbours.
2. 1901-1941: The British Period. This approach changed little after federation. When Britain declared war in 1914, Australia didn’t feel the need to do so itself. Our foreign policy essentially mirrored British foreign policy as we sought to see ourselves as part of the imperial framework. That is, we wanted the British to think of us as part of them, so they would feel obliged to defend us. In 1931, Britain passed the Statue of Westminster, which effectively granted independence to former colonies. This meant Australia was free to develop its own foreign policy. In many ways, this was a worrying development for Australia as it suggested we would no longer be part of Empire’s security framework. In fact, it took 11 years for Australia to recognise this Statute, by which point the focus of security policy had shifted to an alliance with the US.
3. 1941 Onwards. When Britain pulled troops back from the Asia-Pacific to fight elsewhere, Australia looked to the US to offer protection.
   Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Winston Churchill had promised to send forces to defend Australia in return for Australia’s contribution to the war in the Middle East Campaign and the North African Campaign. However, relatively few forces arrived, because Churchill was focused on first defeating the Axis Powers in Europe before turning to Japan. Curtin made the decision in December 1941 to recall the 6th Division and the 7th Division to defend Australia, although the 9th Division remained in North Africa until Axis forces there were defeated. Australian Primeminister John Curtin openly stated that Australia was turning to America rather than the United Kingdom.

   Before the 1940s, the United Kingdom had managed Australia’s foreign relations as a matter of course. Curtin’s decision to formally adopt the Statute of Westminster in late 1942 was a demonstration to the international community that Australia was an independent nation, albeit one dependent on US power. This new security relationship was formalised by the ANZUS treaty, signed in 1951.

   The treaty came about following the close cooperation of the United States, Australia and New Zealand during World War II, during which time Australia had come under attack by a foreign power, Japan, for the first time in its history. Following the end of World War II, the United States was eager to normalize relations with Japan, particularly as the Korean War was still raging a short distance from Japan. With the involvement of China and possibly the Soviet Union in Korea, the Cold War was threatening to become a full-scale war. However, Australia and New Zealand in particular were extremely reluctant to finalize a peace treaty with Japan which would allow for Japanese rearmament. Both countries relented only when an Australian and New Zealand proposal for a three-way security treaty was accepted by the United States.

   The resulting treaty was concluded at San Francisco on September 1, 1951, and entered into force on April 29, 1952. The treaty bound the signatories to recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of them would endanger the peace and safety of the others. It stated ‘The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific’. The three nations also pledged to maintain and develop individual and collective capabilities to resist attack. (From Wikipedia)

As we’ll see, this relationship with the US is effectively responsible for most of the conflicts Australia has been involved in Post-WWII from Korea, through Vietnam to the ongoing War on Terror.

Having spent most of this year looking at the world around us, it’s time to start looking at ourselves and the way that we interact globally. The best way of doing this is to look at the guidelines by which we interact and the interests that we serve in doing so.

The guidelines that shape our interaction with other nations are referred to as Foreign Policy. Every nation has a foreign policy to ensure that its needs are represented in the global community. Foreign Policy is a set of goals that seeks to outline how a particular country will interact on an official basis with other countries of the world and, to a lesser extent, non-state actors such as multilateral power organisations.

Foreign policies are designed to help protect a country’s national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. This can occur as a result of peaceful cooperation with other nations, or through exploitation.

2008 has seen Australia gain a new government who are already displaying a different approach to foreign policy to their predecessors. While Howard tied Australian interests very closely to those of the US, Rudd appears to be more interested in establishing relationships with our Asian neighbours. In this we can see something of the differing approaches to foreign policy taken by Labor and Liberal governments. In very broad terms, Labor governments post-Whitlam have sought to build multilateral relationships with Asia, believing this will bring our country security and economic benefits. Liberal governments have tended to look for a strong ally - namely the US - to protect us should we need protecting.

“The truth is Australia’s voice has been too quiet for too long. That is why during the course of the next three years, the world will see an increasingly activist Australian international policy in areas where we believe we may be able to make a positive difference.” - Kevin Rudd

Above all, foreign policy serves the National Interest. To understand what might be in the National Interest, we need to learn a bit more about our country and its place in the international arena. While ideas on what constitutes ‘in the National Interest’ differs from party to party and person to person, we can start by looking at the following articles from Australian Bureau of Statistics web site.

• Australia’s Place in the International System
• Australia’s Bilateral Relationships
• Australia’s Security Interests
• Australia’s Economic Interests
• Australia and the United Nations
• Australia’s Human Rights Policy
• DFAT’s Role In Australia’s International Relations
• Australia’s Overseas Aid Program

Start by summarising each of these articles. What are some of Australia’s key strengths in terms of international relaionships? What are some of our obligations? What are some of our needs or weaknesses? Which area of National Interest covers the information in the article?

Next, what policies does Australia have in regards to this area?

http://www.dfat.gov.au/globalissues/

As a starter to foreign policy, the below site might be of some interest:

http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ForeignPolicy.asp

Starbucks Coffee to Go?

As we start thinking about revision for the end of year exam, a timely example of a failure of Globalisation can be see in US Coffee Giant Starbucks announing it will be closing all but 15 of its Australian Stores. While this can partly be blamed on global economic strife, the fact that only 600 out of 12,000 US stores will close suggests that there may be cultural reasons behind Australian closures.

Only 5 out of 16 Melbourne stores are likely to remain open. The article below argues that Starbucks have failed in Melbourne because they have failed to take into account local tastes and customs. Instead, the company have attempted to sell what most Melburnians see as ‘inferior coffee’ on brand name alone. In other words, Starbucks assumed that Australians would buy their coffee because of their status in the US market. However, Melbourne has a far more developed cafe culture and, as anyone who has tried to find a decent cup of coffee in the US can tell you, far better coffee.

From the perspective of International Studies, we should be asking the following questions.

• Does the failure of Starbucks in Australia represent an example of the failure of globalisation? If so, how?
• What factors are at work that may have led to the failure of this multinational over others?
• Can this be seen to argue against anti-globalisation activists who believe that globalisation leads to a single, homogenous world culture? How so?

Article:

Memo Starbucks: next time try selling ice to Eskimos (The Age, August 3 2008.)

• What are some of China’s current national interests and how have they gone about achieving them in the Asia-Pacific region?

• Without the USA’s interference, the China-Taiwan situation would not currently exist. Discuss with reference to key incidents in the history of Taiwan post-WWII.

• Discuss the use of power by China in resolving post-Cold War regional conflicts.

• China’s rise to power will inevitably lead to conflict with the USA. Discuss.

Today, we’ve been looking at Chinese influence in the region. Given their rapid rise as a world power, understanding the rise of Chinese power and the way in which their foreign policy functions is incredibly important to both students of International Studies and other states in the region, such as Australia.

If we are to understand the use of power in the Asia Pacific, we need to understand China’s national interests and they way in which they are able to pursue them.

Post-Cold War, the USA has enjoyed a position of hegemony in international affairs. Many see China growing to rival US power, some believing conflict of some kind is inevitable between the two.

We defined Hegemony as:

• capacity for leadership, influence and possibly dominance over others’ foreign relations
• capacity through material and other power, including soft power, to induce countries in the region to do what they would not otherwise do

We identifed 4 areas that impact on Chinese foreign policy.

In terms of their national interests, four main policies to shape regional politics

1. Need to maintain support for “One China”
2. Overall policy framework
3. Relationship with US
4. Energy Needs

As well as their overall approach being informed by the twin ideas of “peace and development” and “keep one’s head down”

We looked at China’s desire to improve its relationships with its neighbours, driven primarily by the need for security and energy resources.

We considered the complex relationship with the US (at times competitors, at other times partners) and the fractious relationship with Japan.

Finally, we examined the four directions Chinese foreign policy is likely to take in the immediate future.

1. China will want to extend its influence as a regional power – limited by ‘peaceful development’ image
2. East coast defence (vulnerable to USA/Japan) – increasing military presence and hegemony, but resistance also growing
3. Counter both US and Japan interest
4. More influence in ASEAN to influence trade

More detail can be found:

Australia needs to invest in learning how China thinks

China’s paths to hegemony

Changes in global hegemony - Here Comes China!

SPY PLANE BRIEFING:

For this task students should:

· Appreciate the complexities of international diplomacy and policy analysis and their importance for effective management of complex international relationships

· Understand why the “spy-plane” incident could not be rapidly resolved by American and Chinese policymakers

· Recognize the “spy-plane” incident as an indication of the increasingly challenging nature of the long-term relationship between the U.S. and China.

Key Questions

What problems in U.S.-China relations were brought to light by the “spy-plane” incident? How would you rate their respective importance, and how well do you think the problems were resolved?

Group A:

Prepare a class briefing for the US administration on what you have learned from this incident and the policies you would recommend to improve or stabilize U.S.-China relations.

Group B:

Prepare a similar briefing for China’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of U.S. Relations. Groups should discuss their main recommendations and note differences in perspective.

Rationale:

Many scholars in think tanks both in China and the U.S. spend their time researching problems such as the “spy-plane” incident and forwarding recommendations to responsible government agencies or legislators on how to interpret and manage them.

These researchers generally have considerable knowledge of U.S.-China relations and read each others’ published articles and Web sites.

This activity is asking you to step into this role and develop advice for government officials about how to manage such problems, taking a variety of perspectives into account.

Pointers:

· Be sure to think about domestic political factors.

· Suggest forms of power that could be used to deal with the incident

· Figure out how the Chinese military is going to look at this incident. What are they likely to demand as the price of supporting a political resolution of the crisis? What are the overall priorities of the government leadership? Why did the Chinese side demand a formal apology? How can they keep trade flowing with the U.S., while factoring in national pride in China’s air force and public anger at American penetration of what China considers to be its offshore airspace? What arguments does the leadership need to meet American demands for the return of its crew and plane and persuade American negotiators to compromise? What terms would you recommend for the release of the American flyers and the plane? How should the government deal with American reconnaissance planes in the future?

For information, check the Web sites listed at:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/china/3.html .)

Background can also be found: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/china/1.html

Helpful Links:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/asia_pacific/2001/spy_plane_row/default.stm

http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/04/01/us.china.plane.02/index.html

The documentary was made in 2001, after a US plane collided with a Chinese fighter pilot.

More information can be found via the link below, including some useful background on the conflict

Dangerous Straits

This page has lots of useful resources: Links

There are two things for you to work on over the holidays.

1) Complete the ‘hot flash’ section of your textbook. This information will be very helpful for the coming SAC. (Questions 1-4, p165)

2) Complete the following practice essay - very similar to the one set for the forthcoming SAC.

The history of the relationship between the PRC and the ROC has shown military power to be ineffective as a means of achieving national interests.

Discuss.

Enjoy the break!

As we’ve seen, China’s interests in terms of foreign policy can roughly be divided into three areas:

Security/Survival - their interest in preventing Taiwan from achieving full independence falls into this category. China wish to maintain the integrity of their sovereign lands, which involves preventing any provinces splintering off and explains their interest in ‘reclaiming’ past-colonies such as Macau and Hong Kong, as well as disputed territories such as Tibet.

As well as possible economic benefits in maintaining (or gaining) a hold over these territories, China need to be seen as being strong and in control of their borders. If one province breaks away successfully, they could see several others use this as a precedent - in much the same way as the collapse of the USSR has led to several former Soviet States seizing or fighting for independence.

Economic - China are certainly seeking to advance their economy, which involves developing strong trade relationships with other states. To do this, they have joined organisations such as the WTO and attained ‘most favoured nation’ status with the US in 2004.

International Standing - this refers to China’s need to improve its political power and influence. To do this it has joined a number of political organisations in the region and involved itself in international peacekeeping activities. Beijing wants to develop friendly relations with both its neighbours and world powers, which means that it is careful in regards to appearing too harsh in its dealings with problems such as Taiwan and Tibet. Following Tianeman Square in 1989, it saw the detrimental effect such outrages can have on its relationships with other countries.

China has to balance its need for Security against these other interests. While it might wish to reclaim Taiwan by force, the international reaction would have a detrimental effect on China’s economic and international standing interests. At the same time, it cannot afford to be seen as too soft, in case it encourages separatist groups.

To understand how these interests are enacted, we need to consider the policy instruments Beijing has at its disposal.

These can be grouped into four headings.

Military - the use of military power to influence an outcome. This doesn’t just refer to China seizing or invading Taiwan by force, but also to Beijing conducting military exercises or testing new hardware on the border. In other words, Beijing shows off its military capacity in order to remind Taiwan how powerful they are, in the hope Taiwan will be cowed into submission.

Diplomatic - this can involve the ‘cutting off’ of official contact with nations who support Taiwan or recognise them as an independent state

Political - this involves China using its political clout as a member of several important international organisations to prevent Taiwan from gaining access, thereby undermining Taiwan’s power and influence.

Economic and Investment - this involves China offering financial incentives for other states to refuse to recognise Taiwan through the lowering of taxes, tarrifs and quotas or by investing large amounts of money in other countries.

This lesson we’re going to start looking at China in terms of its ’soft power’, specifically economy and international standing. As we’ll see over the next couple of lessons, China is able to exert power over the Asia-Pacific region (and beyond) in terms of economic, diplomatic and political power, as well as ‘hard’ military power.

Those of you who are interested can find a lecture on the subject of China and ’soft power’ here:

http://www.asiasociety.org/resources/china_soft_power_032008.html

China’s international standing has taken a battering lately. Here is an article discussing some reasons why this is the case:

http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2006/02/22/1140563858394.html

Here is a Wikipedia article on the history of Chinese Foreign Relations:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_foreign_relations_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China

QUESTIONS: (You will need Scott and Simpson to answer some of these)

1. What evidence is there that China is pursuing economic development?

2. How will this impact on how China will resolve the divided China issue?

3. How has Beijing tried to improve its international reputation?

4. Why has its reputation been damaged recently?

4. Look at this article:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/jul/15/olympicgames2008.sport

Do you think China intended to use the Olympics as an impetus to improve human rights conditions? Explain.

5. How will attempts to improve its reputation impact on how China will resolve the divided China issue?

So, is Taiwan a part of China?

The issue has created a lot of tension in the Pacific region and is still one of the most potentially volatile conflicts, despite few shots ever being fired.

Why is it so volatile?

Well, the worst case scenario is that it could lead to war between China and the USA. Although the USA technically do not disagree with

China’s claim that Taiwan belongs to them, they are also pledged to defend Taiwan if China ever try to reclaim it by force.

At this time, it seems unlikely that China would try to. However, they have been firm in insisting that they have the right to and are not beyond ‘rattling the sabre’ or, in other words, threatening military action from time to time.

The confusion over Western attitudes to this conflict stem from the fact that Taiwan were initially recognised as the official government of China following WWII. Even when they were kicked out of the UN in the 1970s and mainland China gained official recognition, Taiwan claimed to be the official Chinese government until 1989, when democratic elections disposed of the KMT – the ‘Chinese’ government exiled from China in 1949.

Part of the problem in identifying whether Taiwan are part of China then is deciding which China we’re talking about.

From 1949-1989 Taiwan claimed to be China, just a different (exiled) government. – The ROC (Republic of China) or KMT (Kuomintang).

At the same time the communist People’s Republic of China) claimed that they were the official government of China, given that they controlled the mainland.

For these 40 years then, it can be said that there were two Chinas, although which was internationally recognised as the ‘official’ Chinese government changed in this period.

Given that Taiwan has now relinquished any claim to rightfully rule over the mainland, there is only ‘one’ China. However, the Chinese Government feel that Taiwan should be part of this ‘one’ China. The Taiwanese, now successful in their own right, are reluctant to acknowledge this. They have spent many years attempting to be recognised as an independent state by the international community. Although they are yet to be readmitted to the UN in their own right, in 2001 they were admitted to the WTO. Although the WTO thus requires China to recognise that Taiwan has equal rights within the organisation, the official name given to Taiwan is ‘Chinese Taipei.’

From this we can see that the international powers are still very wary about antagonising China unnecessarily over this issue.

As it happens, China and Taiwan have just begun negotiations for the first time since 1999. A report on this can be found on the link below, along with a useful timeline:

http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKSP28081420080612

An argument for why Taiwan should not be seen as part of China:

http://www.iht.com/articles/1993/09/21/edyang.php

A timeline of the last 60 years can be found here:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/asia_pacific/2000/taiwan_elections2000/default.stm

Whereas a timeline for China can be found here:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1288392.stm

A Q&A about the most recent “hot flash” in 2004 can be found here:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1782759.stm

http://thesosbrog.wordpress.com/2008/04/04/the-chinese-perspective-on-tibet-the-american-presidential-election-and-race

An interesting, small-scale example of the differing opinions inside and outside China on the China/Taiwan and China/Tibet situation.

We have considered different types and forms of power (eg. Soft and Hard; Military, Economic, Diplomatic) - but what are these types of power used for?

Power in itself may be seen by some as an end goal in itself, but generally states use power to protect what is referred to as the National Interest.

Put simply, National Interest refers to a state’s goals or ambitions. We look to National Interest to explain why states do the things they do - what rationale there is for their actions. National Interest is used to justify and examine a state’s exercising of various forms of power.

Just as you have your own interests in terms of career choices, leisure pursuits and academic achievements, a state will have its own ideas about what is best for it. Examples of these things are:

Security - first and foremost, a state will want to feel that it can go about its business unthreatened. Any other interests are always secondary to this. No state, no need for any other interests.

Economic - China has always had detailed longterm economic plans, which can be seen it is rise to regional dominance over the last decade or so. Democratic governments tend to have more short-term economic goals, mainly as each government wants benefits to be seen within the term for which they have been elected - for example, to lower unemployment by 10%.

Cultural - Preservation of native culture has become increasingly important in our globalised world. Many countries have policies designed to protect indigenous customs and values from erosion under outside influences. An example of this can be seen in the Australian Government insisting a certain percentage of television and radio programming is Australian made. Perhaps a more vivid example can be seen in the ongoing conflict between China and Tibet. Although the Chinese believe Tibet is part of China, the Tibetans are very keen to preserve their own history and way of life. It is important to note, of course, that Tibet is not a state (given they don’t have exclusive sovereignty over their region), the Tibetan people can be thought of as a nation.

Ideological - the preservation or upholiding of ideological values such as capitalism, democracy, freedom have played a large part in the use of power by states over the last century. The longest-running example of an ideological clash was, of course, the Cold War, but some might say that the War on Terror now provides an alternative. Note how much of the US adminstration’s rhetoric regarding the conflict has involved the words ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ - as if these alone are interests worth fighting for.

International Standing - once referred to as ‘honour’, this can be seen as a state’s need to look good in front of its peers. Although there are clearly benefits to security by maintaining a good relationship with other states, international standing recognises the need for states to be seen as ‘righteous’, with a proper understanding of its responsibilities to both its own citizens and the citizens of other countries. An example of this can be found in the charitable responses to international crises such as the 2004 Tsunami. A key interest for states such as Australia became the need to restructure debts and loan arrangements with affected South Asian countries, along with sending in a relief effort. Actions taken in the service of International Standing almost always constitute the exercise of ’soft’ power.

How can we identify national interest?

A knowledge of the history of a country is always of great benefit. We will be studying the interests of several states throughout the China-Taiwan conflict. To do this, we’ll need to understand why the conflict exists and how the interests of other states such as the USA have changed over the last 50 years.

The simplest way to note these interests is to read the papers and press releases from government leaders. Most states are usually upfront about their interests and goals.

A final note:

Conservative governments such as the current US adminstration generally use National Interest as an excuse to discard any expectations of moral or multilateral conduct. In other words, National Interest justifies unilateral action, such as the invasion of Iraq, when one country’s interests are seen to outweigh those of the international community in terms of importance.

As we begin to study the China/Taiwan conflict, here’s an excellent and exhaustive list of resources:

http://newton.uor.edu/Departments&Programs/AsianStudiesDept/china-taiwan.html